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Social institutions often use rewards and penalties to promote cooperation.
Providing incentives tends to be costly, so it is important to find effective
and efficient policies for the combined use of rewards and penalties. Most
studies of cooperation, however, have addressed rewarding and punishing
in isolation and have focused on peer-to-peer sanctioning as opposed to
institutional sanctioning. Here, we demonstrate that an institutional sanc-
tioning policy we call ‘first carrot, then stick’ is unexpectedly successful in
promoting cooperation. The policy switches the incentive from rewarding
to punishing when the frequency of cooperators exceeds a threshold. We
find that this policy establishes and recovers full cooperation at lower cost
and under a wider range of conditions than either rewards or penalties
alone, in both well-mixed and spatial populations. In particular, the spatial
dynamics of cooperation make it evident how punishment acts as a ‘booster
stage’ that capitalizes on and amplifies the pro-social effects of rewarding.
Together, our results show that the adaptive hybridization of incentives
offers the ‘best of both worlds’ by combining the effectiveness of rewarding
in establishing cooperation with the effectiveness of punishing in recovering
it, thereby providing a surprisingly inexpensive and widely applicable
method of promoting cooperation.
1. Introduction
Cooperation is desirable whenever groups of cooperating individuals can reap
higher benefits than groups of individuals acting out of individual self-interest.
Promoting cooperation can be difficult, however, because a single non-cooperating
individual (‘defector’) in a group of cooperators often achieves a higher net benefit
by free-riding on the others’ contributions. An efficient policy for promoting
cooperation needs to overcome two fundamental challenges: to ensure that
cooperators can gain a foothold in a population of defectors and to protect a
population of cooperators from exploitation by defectors once cooperation has
been established.
Incentives can help overcome these challenges [1–3]. The promise of reward
or the threat of punishment can induce cooperation among self-interested indi-
viduals who would otherwise prefer actions that undermine the public good.
At first glance, there might seem to be little difference between a reward and
a penalty: after all, cooperation is induced whenever the size of the incentive
exceeds the pay-off difference between a cooperator and a defector, regardless
of whether the incentive is positive or negative [4]. This equivalence ceases to
hold, however, when one considers the costs of implementing an incentive
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scheme. Rewarding a large number of cooperators or penaliz-
ing a large number of defectors is either very costly or
becomes ineffective when a limited budget for incentives is
stretched out too far. Pamela Oliver exemplifies this with
the problem of fundraising: ‘If only 5% of the population
needs to contribute to an Arts Fund for it to be successful,
they can be rewarded by having their names printed in a pro-
gram: it would be silly and wasteful to try to punish the 95%
who did not contribute’ [5, p. 125]. While the challenges of
implementing positive and negative incentives are separately
well known [2,3] and weight has traditionally been given to
peer-to-peer punishment [6–8], no study to date has estab-
lished how such incentives should best be combined at an
institutional level to promote cooperation.
Here, we demonstrate how an institution implementing
incentives can effectively establish and recover cooperation at
low cost. Institutional sanctioning is widespread [1,4,9–22];
however, surprisingly few theoretical studies have thus far
considered the effects of institutionalized incentives on the
evolution of cooperation, and the few studies that exist have
either considered rewarding and punishing in isolation
[4,9,19] or did not consider how optional incentives change
with the frequency of cooperators [10–12]. Indeed, sanctioning
agents, such as officers and managers, often alter rewards and
penalties as events unfold. We address this question in an
established game-theoretical framework for studying the evol-
ution of cooperation under institutionalized incentives [4,19].
By considering the strengths of positive and negative incen-
tives as independent variables, we can encompass a range of
hybrid incentive policies. In particular, by allowing the relative
allocation of incentives to rewarding and punishing to vary
with the frequency of cooperators, our framework includes
hybrid incentive policies controlled by adaptive feedback
from the population’s current state.
2. Model and methods
2.1. Institutional incentives
We aim to determine the best way to allocate a budget available
to an institution for promoting cooperation through positive
and negative incentives. As criteria for assessing the per-
formance of alternative sanctioning policies, we consider their
effectiveness and efficiency in promoting cooperation. For
measuring effectiveness, we assess the diversity of conditions
for which full cooperation can be established or recovered
with certainty, and for measuring efficiency, we determine the
cumulative cost and total time required to convert a population
of defectors to full cooperation or to recover full cooperation
after the invasion of a single defector.
2.2. Public good games with dynamic incentives
Ourmodel is based on the public goodgame for cooperation (C)
and defection (D), widely recognized as themost suitablemath-
ematical metaphor for studying cooperation in large groups
[23–28]. We posit well-mixed populations of interacting indi-
viduals. From time to time, individuals randomly selected
from the population formann-player groupwithn  2.A coop-
erator invests a fixed amount c. 0 into a common pool,
whereas a defector invests nothing. The total contribution to
the pool is then multiplied by a public-benefit factor r. 1 and
distributed equally among all n group members. The infamous
‘tragedy of the commons’ [29] arises when r, n and no incen-
tives are applied, because single individuals can then improve
their pay-offs by withholding their contributions.
The total budget for providing incentives is given by nd
per group, where d. 0 is the average per capita incentive.
This budget nd is then divided into two parts based on a rela-
tive weight w with 0  w  1. The part wnd is equally shared
among the nC cooperators in the group (see Chen et al. [17] for
a similar application to the n-person volunteer’s dilemma),
who thus each obtain a reward awnd/nC, while the remainder
(12 w)nd is used for equally punishing the n2 nC defectors,
who thus each have their pay-offs reduced by b(12 w)nd/
(n2 nC). The factors a,b. 0 are the respective leverages of
rewarding and punishing, i.e. the factors by which a recipient’s
pay-off is increased or decreased relative to the cost of
implementing the incentive. ‘Antisocial’ incentives, rewarding
defectors or punishing cooperators [30], could in principle be
considered, but as such incentives only reduce cooperation
and promote defection, they are not studied here.
We account for feedback from the population’s state by
allowing the weight w to depend on the frequency of coop-
erators. Pure rewarding and pure punishing correspond to
w ¼ 1 or w ¼ 0, respectively. Therefore, a cooperator and a
defector obtain the pay-offs
rcnC
n
 cþ awnd
nC
and
rcnC
n
 b(1 w)nd
n nC , (2:1)
respectively.
2.3. Replicator dynamics
We assume replicator dynamics [31], which describe how the
frequencies of different strategies change in infinitely large,
well-mixed populations. Replicator dynamics are governed
by a system of differential equations, _xi ¼ xi(Pi  P), in
which xi, Pi and P denote, respectively, the frequency of strat-
egy i, the average pay-off for strategy i, and the average pay-off
in the whole population ( P ¼PixiPi, with Pixi ¼ 1). In the
public good game studied here, we consider cooperation
and defection with respective frequencies x and 12 x.
The replicator dynamics are therefore given by a single
differential equation, _x ¼ x(PC  P). With P ¼ xPCþ
(1 x)PD, we obtain
_x ¼ x(1 x)(PD  PC): (2:2)
This differential equation has at least two equilibria: x ¼ 0,
at which all individuals defect, and x ¼ 1, at which all
individuals cooperate.
Our model extends the traditional public good game
[23–28] by incorporating incentives. Specifically, letting k
denote the number of cooperators among the n 2 1 co-
players in a group, the expected pay-offs for a defector and
a cooperator are given by
PD ¼
Xn1
k¼0
n 1
k
 
xk(1 x)n1k rck
n
 b(1 w)nd
n k
 
(2:3a)
and
PC ¼
Xn1
k¼0
n 1
k
 
xk(1 x)n1k rc(k þ 1)
n
 cþ awnd
k þ 1
 
:
(2:3b)
Without incentives, d ¼ 0, we have PD 2 PC ¼ c(12 r/n) ¼ F,
which is the defector’s advantage in the public good game.
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The replicator dynamics in equation (2.2) thus lead to full
defection, x ¼ 0, when r , n and to full cooperation, x ¼ 1,
when r . n. According to equations (2.3), incentives d. 0
modify the defector’s advantage for 0, x, 1 as follows:
PD  PC
¼ F nd
Xn1
k¼0
n 1
k
 
xk(1 x)n1k aw
k þ 1þ
b(1 w)
n k
 
:
(2:4a)
Using n 1k
 
n
k þ 1 ¼
n
k þ 1
 
and n 1k
 
n
n k ¼
n
k
 
,
this yields
PD  PC ¼ F d aw
Xn1
k¼0
n
k þ 1
 
xk(1 x)n1k
"
þb(1 w)
Xn1
k¼0
n
k
 
xk(1 x)n1k
#
¼ F d aw
Xn
k0¼1
n
k0
 
xk
0
(1 x)nk0
x
"
þb(1 w)
Xn1
k¼0
n
k
 
xk(1 x)nk
1 x
#
¼ F d aw 1 (1 x)
n
1 (1 x) þ b(1 w)
1 xn
1 x
 
¼ F d aw
Xn1
k¼0
(1 x)k þ b(1 w)
Xn1
k¼0
xk
" #
:
(2:4b)
When rewarding or punishing are applied in isolation (w¼ 1
or w¼ 0), the defector’s advantage simplifies to F adPn1k¼0
(1 x)k and F bdPn1k¼0 xk, respectively [4,19]. Thus, the defec-
tor’s advantage is strictly increasing with the frequency x of
cooperators for pure rewarding and strictly decreasing with the
frequency x for pure punishing. In both the cases, there exists a
unique interior equilibrium of the replicator dynamics if and
only if the per capita incentive d lies within an intermediate
range, d2 , d, dþ, with
d ¼ F
an
and dþ ¼ F
a
: (2:5)
Here the value of a depends on the type of incentive being
applied: a¼ a for rewarding and a¼ b for punishing. The
unique interior equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable for
pure rewarding and unstable for pure punishing. Therefore,
when incentives are intermediate, d2 , d, dþ, the replicator
dynamics for pure rewarding lead to a mixture of defectors
and cooperators,while forpurepunishing, they lead tobistability
between full defection and full cooperation. By contrast, if incen-
tives are very small, d d2, or very large, d dþ, the replicator
dynamics for pure rewarding and for pure punishing lead to
full defection or full cooperation, respectively.
3. Results
We first demonstrate, in §3.1, that an institutional sanctioning
policy we call ‘first carrot, then stick’, which switches from
rewarding to punishing when the frequency of cooperators
exceeds a threshold, minimizes the defector’s advantage. Its
effectiveness and efficiency are investigated in §3.2 and
compared with those of pure rewarding and pure punishing.
We extend our results to spatial populations in §3.3 and con-
clude by verifying, in §3.4, that our results are robust to other
parameter combinations and other model variants.
3.1. ‘First carrot, then stick’ as an optimal sanctioning
policy
By allowing the fraction w of the incentive budget that is allo-
cated to rewarding, rather than to punishing, to change with
the frequency of cooperators, w ¼ w(x), we can represent a
broad range of institutional sanctioning policies. Below we
show that the ‘first carrot, then stick’ sanctioning policy is opti-
mal in that it minimizes the defector’s advantage PD2 PC; it
thus maximizes the selection gradient _x at any frequency x
of cooperators. This means that the ‘first carrot, then stick’
sanctioning policy results in the highest level of cooperation
for each parameter combination and that it consequently is
the most effective institutional sanctioning policy.
To see that the ‘first carrot, then stick’ sanctioning policy
minimizes the defector’s advantage, we first write equation
(2.4b) as
PD  PC ¼ F d w
Xn1
k¼0
(a(1 x)k  bxk)þ b
Xn1
k¼0
xk
" #
: (3:1)
As this equation is linear with respect to the weight w, a value
of w of either 0 or 1 is optimal depending on whether the sumPn1
k¼0 (a(1 x)k  bxk) is positive or negative, respectively. (In
the degenerate case when this sum equals zero, any value of
w will be optimal.) One can show that this sum is a decreas-
ing function of x with exactly one root x ¼ x^ satisfying
0 , x^ , 1, about which the sum changes sign from positive
to negative as x increases. Thus, PD2 PC is minimized for
the following on–off control
w(x) ¼ 1
0
if
if
0  x , x^,
x^ , x  1,

(3:2)
with
Pn1
k¼0 (a(1x^)k  bx^k) ¼ 0. This means that rewarding is
optimal when the fraction of cooperators is below x^; other-
wise, punishing is optimal. For obvious reasons, we call
this institutional sanctioning policy ‘first carrot, then stick’.
3.2. Effectiveness and efficiency of ‘first carrot, then
stick’
Figure 1 shows how the replicator dynamics are affected by per
capita incentives d under pure rewarding, pure punishing and
the optimal policy in equation (3.2), with the assumption that
rewarding is equally efficient (a ¼ b) or less efficient (a, b)
than punishing [32] (see also figure 2a–f). In particular, the
effects of the optimal policy, which are illustrated in figure
1e,f can be understood analytically. At the boundaries x ¼ 0
and x ¼ 1, PD2 PC in equation (3.1) takes the values F2 and
and F2 bnd, respectively. With the weight w(x) from equation
(3.2), PD2 PC takes its maximum value, F ad
Pn1
k¼0 (1x^)k
(or equivalently, F bdPn1k¼0 x^ k), at x ¼ x^; PD2 PC is strictly
increasing for 0  x , x^ and strictly decreasing for x^ , x  1.
Hence, PD2 PC¼ 0 can have at most two interior roots x.
Indeed, for d,minfF/(an),F/(bn)g, the replicator dynamics
converge to x¼ 0. For d. F/(an), a stable equilibrium enters
the interior state space 0, x, 1 at x¼ 0, and the full-defection
equilibrium, x¼ 0, becomes unstable. For d. F/(bn), an
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
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unstable equilibrium enters the interior state space 0, x, 1 at
x ¼ 1, and the full-cooperation equilibrium, x ¼ 1, becomes
stable. Thus, the interior state space 0, x, 1 has both
stable and unstable equilibria if
max
F
an
,
F
bn
 
, d ,
F
a
Pn1
k¼0 (1x^)k
¼ F
b
Pn1
k¼0 x^
k : (3:3)
As d increases within this interval, the two interior equilibria
approach each other and eventually merge and vanish at the
upper bound of this interval. For values of d beyond this
interval’s upper bound, the replicator dynamics converge to
x ¼ 1. In the special case when rewarding and punishing
are equally efficient, a ¼ b, the stable and unstable equilibria
enter the interior state space simultaneously (figure 1e). Con-
versely, in the extreme case when rewarding is much less
efficient than punishing, a b, punishing alone is sufficient
from the very beginning, and hybridization with relatively
expensive rewarding is irrelevant.
For well-mixed populations, we have proved in §3.1 that the
hybridizationof positive andnegative incentives according to the
‘first carrot, then stick’ sanctioning policy described by equation
(3.2) minimizes the defector’s advantage, which ensures that this
sanctioningpolicy ismost effective for converting apopulation of
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Figure 1. Equilibrium cooperation frequencies of public good games in well-mixed populations for three institutional sanctioning policies. Each panel shows how the
locations of stable and unstable equilibrium cooperation frequencies (continuous and dashed lines, respectively) depend on the per capita incentive d. With no or
very small incentives d, full defection (x ¼ 0) is the only outcome, and for sufficiently large incentives d, so is full cooperation (x ¼ 1). This result applies to all
three considered sanctioning policies: pure rewarding with w ¼ 1, pure punishing with w ¼ 0, and the adaptive hybrid policy with w given by equation (3.2).
Intermediate incentives d have strikingly different impacts, as follows. (a,b) Rewarding: When the institution increases the incentive beyond a threshold, a stable
interior equilibrium enters the state space at x ¼ 0, moves up to x ¼ 1, and eventually exits the state space at x ¼ 1. Consequently, full defection gives way to
intermediate levels of cooperation, and finally to full cooperation. This outcome is independent of the initial condition. (c,d ) Punishing: When the institution
increases the incentive beyond a threshold, an unstable interior equilibrium enters the state space at x ¼ 1, moves down to x ¼ 0, and eventually exits the
state space at x ¼ 0. Consequently, full defection gives way to bistability of full defection and full cooperation, and finally to full cooperation. In (d ), as the
leverage b of punishing increases, full cooperation is established more readily, and the threshold value above which full cooperation is established regardless
of the initial condition is smaller than in (c). For ease of comparison, the thin dashed line in (d ) shows the unstable equilibria corresponding to (c). (e,f ) Adaptive
hybrid: When the institution increases the incentive beyond a threshold, full defection gives rise to bistability of intermediate cooperation and full cooperation, and
finally to full cooperation. The two interior equilibria that arise, one stable and one unstable, annihilate each other for sufficiently large institutional incentives,
leaving full cooperation as the global attractor. In ( f ), as the leverage b of punishing increases, full cooperation is established for smaller institutional incentives than
in (e). For ease of comparison, the thin continuous and dashed lines in ( f ) show the stable and unstable equilibria of (e), respectively. As punishing is more effective
than rewarding, the switching threshold of the adaptive hybrid policy is below x ¼ 0.5. Parameters: n ¼ 5, r ¼ 2, c ¼ 1, a ¼ 1 and b ¼ 1 (a,c,e) or 1.5 (b,d,f ).
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defectors to cooperation (figure 2a–f). By combining thedifferen-
tial advantages of rewarding and punishing, this sanctioning
policy is far more effective than pure punishing in establishing
cooperation (figure 2c,e) and farmore effective thanpure reward-
ing in recovering cooperation (figure 2b,f ). Offering the ‘best of
both worlds’, the ‘first carrot, then stick’ sanctioning policy for
combining rewarding with punishing is therefore hereafter also
called the ‘adaptive hybrid’ sanctioning policy.
Although it is natural to expect that the threshold x^ at
which the adaptive hybrid policy switches from rewarding to
punishing might depend on other parameters, this is not the
case: the threshold remains the same independent of the per
capita incentive d and the public-benefit factor r. What is more,
when there is no difference in leverage between positive and
negative incentives (a ¼ b), this threshold is situated at a 50% fre-
quency of cooperators, x^ ¼ 0:5. In practice, punishing is often
more effective than rewarding (a, b) [32], in which case the
switching point for optimal hybridization is situated at a fre-
quency of cooperators of less than 50%, x^ , 0:5 (figure 1f ).
The adaptive hybrid policy is not only more effective, but
also more efficient, for establishing and recovering cooperation
than either rewarding or punishing alone (figure 3a–f ).
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Figure 2. Effects of institutional sanctioning policies on public good games in well-mixed and spatial populations. The adaptive hybrid policy exhibits the broadest
domain of successfully establishing full cooperation (green) from an initially single cooperator ( first and third columns from the left), and also of recovering full
cooperation against an initially single defector (second and fourth columns from the left). With no or very small per capita incentives d, full defection (red) is the
only outcome, and with sufficiently large incentives, so is full cooperation; this result applies to all three institutional sanctioning policies. Intermediate incentives
have strikingly different impacts, as follows. (a,b,g,h) Rewarding: In well-mixed populations, the outcome is independent of the initial condition; (a,b) are identical.
In spatial populations, by contrast, full cooperation and full defection are more likely to be maintained when the public-benefit factor r is large and the per capita
incentive d is small, as seen in the upper left corners of (g) and (h), respectively. (c,d,i,j ) Punishing: When the institution increases d beyond a threshold value
(which depends on r), full defection abruptly changes into full cooperation. The differences between (c) and (d ) or (i) and ( j ) indicate combinations of r and d for
which full cooperation and full defection are both stable and for which the initial conditions, therefore, affect the outcome. The differences between (c) and (i)
indicate that, interestingly, spatial population structure substantially reduces the range of combinations of r and d for which a single cooperator can invade,
especially for large r. In (i)—and also in the upper parts of (g) and ( j ), as well as in the lower parts of (k) and (l )—the narrow ( yellow) band between
no cooperation and full cooperation results from the survival probability of the initial cooperator (and therefore does not indicate the coexistence of cooperators
and defectors). (e,f,k,l ) Adaptive hybrid: The domain of recovering full cooperation is almost equal to the case of punishing ( f,l), while the domain of establishing
full cooperation is much enlarged relative to the case of punishing, (e) and (k). In particular, as the institution increases d, the equilibrium frequency of cooperators
gradually rises, and when d crosses a threshold value (again dependent on r), which is smaller than in the case of punishing, full cooperation is established abruptly
(e,k). Parameters: n ¼ 5, c ¼ 1, a ¼ b ¼ 1, s ¼ 10 and N ¼ 100 (implying a population size of 10 000).
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Once a state of full cooperation has been reached, punishing is
cheaper as a means of recovering cooperation, as it needs to
be used only occasionally. As the adaptive hybrid policy stipu-
lates punishment once the frequency of cooperators surpasses
the threshold x^, it is similar to pure punishment in this respect.
The two policies differ markedly, however, in the cost of
converting a population of defectors to a population of
cooperators. The adaptive hybrid policy has the lowest cumu-
lative cost of all three sanctioning policies, and hence requires
both the lowest establishment cost and the lowest recovery cost
for full cooperation. With respect to conversion speed, it gen-
erically takes a similar (finite) time for all three policies to
establish and recover cooperation (electronic supplementary
material, figure S1).
3.3. Extension to spatial populations
In the real world, social planning tends to be spatially distribu-
ted and is often supported by sanctioning institutions. To see
whether the adaptive hybrid policy copes well with the result-
ing spatio-temporal complexity, we extend our framework to a
spatial population in which each individual inhabits one cell of
an N  N square lattice with periodic boundaries. In each gen-
eration, every individual on this lattice engages in a public good
game with its four nearest neighbours (n ¼ 5) and collects its
total pay-off through joining all the five games within its inter-
action neighbourhood. Then, the strategies of all individuals are
updated simultaneously. When a focal individual i’s strategy is
updated, a neighbour of it, j, is drawn at random among i’s four
nearest neighbours. Subsequently, individual i adopts its neigh-
bour j’s strategy with probability [1 þ exp(s(Ei2 Ej))]21, where
Eidenotes individual i’s total pay-off and sdetermines the inten-
sity of selection [33,34]. The sanctioning institution receives
feedback from the five local participants, which means that
the x in equation (3.2) denotes the frequency of cooperators
within a givenneighbourhood. The positive andnegative incen-
tives determined by the adaptive hybrid policy therefore vary
across the lattice as local conditions require.
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Figure 3. Costs for establishing and recovering full cooperation. The adaptive hybrid policy is not only the most effective (figure 2) but also the least expensive in
establishing full cooperation from an initially single cooperator ( first and third columns from the left) and in recovering full cooperation against an initially single
defector (second and fourth columns from the left). If no or very small incentives are provided, achieving each of these goals is impossible (white), independent of
the institutional policy. Otherwise, these policies have strikingly different impacts on the required cumulative costs. (a,b,g,h) Rewarding: Both in well-mixed and in
spatial populations, rewarding requires recovery costs that are 1000–100 000 times more expensive than those for punishing or the adaptive hybrid policy. Fur-
thermore, this relative cost difference increases in proportion to population size. (c,d ,i, j ) Punishing: In the case of punishing, recovery costs are much reduced relative
to the case of rewarding, while establishment costs remain at a similarly high level as, or are even slightly larger than, in the case of rewarding. (e,f,k,l ) Adaptive
hybrid: The adaptive hybrid policy requires recovery costs that are similar to the case of punishing (and thus much lower than in the case of rewarding), but
substantially reduces establishment costs relative to either rewarding or punishing. (For a detailed explanation of the costs at the border of the white regions,
see electronic supplementary material, figure S1.) All parameters as in figure 2.
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Also in spatial populations, the adaptive hybrid policy
turns out to be superior (figure 2g– l). Unexpectedly, it
gives rise to spatial patterns of cooperation and defection
that cannot easily be predicted from the patterns arising
under either rewarding or punishing alone. For small
and large incentives, the patterns emerging from the
adaptive hybrid policy when considering a single co-
operator in a population of defectors resemble the
patterns observed under pure rewarding and punishing,
respectively. Cooperators thrive under a policy of pure
rewarding (figure 4a), forming fragmented islands in
which they are locally interspersed with defectors, but ulti-
mately fail to establish full cooperation for the incentive
strength considered. Under a policy of pure punishing
(figure 4b), spatio-temporal dynamics are different: an inva-
sion that begins with a single cooperator in a population of
defectors always results in a contiguous cluster of coopera-
tors that grows and eventually displaces all defectors.
The adaptive hybrid policy, by contrast, for intermediate
incentive strengths exhibits an intriguing transition
between these two distinct patterns: fragmented islands of
cooperators, initially supported by rewarding, create cir-
cumstances under which punishing can act as a ‘booster
stage’ that capitalizes on and amplifies the pro-social effects
of rewarding, promoting the rapid growth of contiguous
clusters of cooperators that eventually displace all defectors
(figure 4c).
All three policies are capable of recovering cooperation in
much the same way as for well-mixed populations. The only
qualitative difference is that the successful spread of defec-
tors originating from an initially single defector can
occasionally split contiguous clusters of cooperators. This
phenomenon, however, which has previously been described
for the spatial extension of the well-studied Prisoner’s
Dilemma [35], occurs in our model only for vanishing or
very small incentives.
3.4. Robustness
In the electronic supplementary material, we demonstrate the
robustness of our results with respect to the following model
variants. (i) First, we establish that in spatial populations the
adaptive hybrid policy with either local or global feedback
establishes and recovers full cooperation at lower cost and
under a wider range of conditions than an alternative hybrid-
ization of positive and negative incentives in which the
weight w is proportional to the frequency of cooperators,
w(x) ¼ x (electronic supplementary material, figure S2). We
also show that information about the local frequency of
cooperation allows a sanctioning institution that implements
the adaptive hybrid policy to establish full cooperation more
readily than information about the global (i.e. population-
wide) frequency of cooperation [20]. This result is in line
with expectations, as tailoring a strategy to local conditions
should generally achieve better results than a strategy that
depends on conditions averaged across large spatial scales.
We also explore (ii) a variant of the public good game in
which a cooperator does not benefit from its own contribution
[4,19] (electronic supplementary material, figure S3) and (iii) a
variant of the incentive scheme inwhichwe relax the assumption
that the received incentive is inversely proportional to
the number of cooperators or defectors in an interacting
group [4,19] (electronic supplementary material, figure S4).
Furthermore, we test variants of our spatial model with
(iv) interactions encompassing the eight nearest neighbours
[33–35] (chess-king move, n ¼ 9, electronic supplementary
material, figure S5), (v) smaller population size (electronic sup-
plementary material, figure S6), (vi) asynchronous updating
t = 400
(b)
t = 600
t = 100t = 50 t = 200
t = 50
(c) adaptive hybrid
(a) punishingrewarding
t = 20 t = 100
t = 100generation t = 50 t = 200
cooperator defector
t = 200
booster stage
Figure 4. Emerging patterns of cooperation. For each incentive policy, the sequence of panels displays the spatio-temporal dynamics of cooperation, starting from a
single cooperator in a population of defectors. (a) Rewarding: A fragmented cluster of cooperators interspersed with defectors expands until small cooperator clusters
occur across the whole population (electronic supplementary material, movie S1). (b) Punishing: The initially single cooperator expands into a contiguous cluster of
cooperators, which eventually covers the entire population (electronic supplementary material, movie S2). (c) Adaptive hybrid: The initial spread of small cooperator
clusters closely resembles the case of rewarding. This development prepares the ground for local switches from rewarding to punishing, which drives the expansion
of contiguous clusters of cooperators. This ‘booster stage’ enables the establishment of full cooperation for much lower incentives d than in the case of punishing
(electronic supplementary material, movie S3). Parameters: r ¼ 2 and d ¼ 0.22 (a), 0.75 (b) or 0.22 (c). All other parameters as in figure 2.
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[33,34] (electronic supplementarymaterial, figure S7), (vii) a pro-
portional imitation rule [33,34] (electronic supplementary
material, figure S8), (viii) errors in perception and implemen-
tation (for individuals [36] or institutions [37], electronic
supplementary material, figures S9–S13) and (ix) varied switch-
ing thresholds (electronic supplementary material, figure S14).
We find that none of the variants (ii)–(viii) qualitatively affect
our results regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the
three considered sanctioning policies (electronic supplementary
material, figures S3–S13). Exploring (ix) reveals that, for equal
leverages of positive andnegative incentives, the optimal switch-
ing threshold for spatial populations approximately equals 50%,
just as in well-mixed populations (electronic supplementary
material, figures S14).
As a final model variant, we assume that (x) individuals
equally share the cost of funding the incentive budget (e.g.
through an entrance fee or poll tax) [4,19]. For this model var-
iant, we find the resulting dynamics to be entirely unaffected.
4. Discussion
Here we have demonstrated how an institutional sanctioning
policy of ‘first carrot, then stick’ can be surprisingly suc-
cessful in promoting cooperation. This policy establishes
and recovers cooperation at a lower cost and under a wider
range of conditions than either rewards or penalties alone
can do. Our findings are based on the public good game, a
standard framework for cooperation in groups. They apply
to both well-mixed and spatial populations and remain
robust under a broad spectrum of model variations and
parameter combinations.
To promote cooperation, rewards and penalties are fre-
quently used in concert. Considering how often they are
used together—at all levels of organization, from parents to
teachers to leaders of organizations—it is surprising that no
prior study to date has investigated the optimal use of a com-
bination of rewards and penalties in an institutional setting.
Here we have demonstrated that the optimal institutional
sanctioning policy is not given by a gradual change in the
relative allocation towards rewards and penalties, but by a
sudden switch from positive to negative incentives once
cooperation is sufficiently widespread. For example, teachers
who wish to establish order in an unruly group of pupils may
thus be well advised first to reward those pupils who behave
well and, once good behaviour has become the norm, shift to
reprimanding those pupils who do not. Similarly, leaders
faced with the difficult task of implementing an unpopular
directive may initially reward those who voluntarily
comply with it and, once the directive has been largely
phased in, make it mandatory, enforced by a penalty for
non-compliance. As these two examples indicate, the ‘first
carrot, then stick’ sanctioning policy can easily be adapted
to many real-life situations, making it a widely applicable
method for promoting cooperation.
Interestingly, when the ‘first carrot, then stick’ sanctioning
policy, here also called the adaptive hybrid policy, is used to
promote cooperation in spatial populations, it gives rise to
complex spatial patterns of cooperators and defectors that
differ qualitatively from the simpler patterns that arise
when rewards or penalties are used in isolation. This
is because punishing acts as a booster stage that reinforces
the pro-social effects of rewarding, thus allowing cooperation
to be rapidly established in those parts of a population
where cooperation has surpassed the critical threshold.
Although our analytical methods do not extend to spatial
populations, extensive numerical investigations confirm
that a sudden switch from rewarding to punishing, not a
gradual change in the relative allocation to these incentives,
also is optimal for promoting and recovering cooperation in
spatial populations.
Our theoretical results can be compared with the handful
of experimental studies that have explored the combined use
of positive and negative incentives in peer-to-peer sanction-
ing [38–41] or in sanctioning by an assigned team leader
[42]. Although these studies differ significantly in their exper-
imental design, they share two common characteristics. First,
punishment is typically more effective than rewarding at pro-
moting high contributions to the public good. Second,
players initially have a propensity for rewarding cooperation,
which is soon superseded by a propensity for punishing
defectors [38–40]. While the latter trend might superficially
be interpreted as corroborative evidence for the effectiveness
of the institutional sanctioning policy developed here, the
rationale for shifting from positive to negative incentives is
strikingly different. In the experimental studies, this shift
typically coincides with declining average contributions and
can thus be interpreted as a response to the emergence of
defectors [42]. In particular, a study on team leadership con-
cludes that ‘leaders who experience frequent complete free-
riding and high variance in contributions in their teams are
more likely to switch from positive to negative incentives’
[42], while other studies find that punishing is more effective
than rewarding at staving off complete free-riding [38–40].
By contrast, we have demonstrated the advantage of shifting
from positive to negative incentives as contributions increase,
and we predict that rewarding is more effective than punishing
in staving off complete free-riding [43].
We have determined the optimal sanctioning policy for a
social institution charged with overseeing rational agents.
Two complementary studies on peer-to-peer sanctioning that
account, respectively, for reputation effects and for the poten-
tial of group selection have similarly highlighted the role of
positive incentives in promoting incipient cooperation among
defectors [36,44]. These theoretical predictions, derived under
the assumption of rational behaviour, clearly question the
wisdom of the human behaviour observed in the aforemen-
tioned experimental studies. Understanding whether
punishment in the face of rampant defection is a human fal-
lacy or a rational choice under circumstances other than the
ones analysed here is a key challenge for future research.
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